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Psychological Perspectives on Gender in Negotiation  
A fundamental form of human interaction, negotiation is essential to the management of 
relationships, the coordination of paid and household labor, the distribution of resources, and the 
creation of economic value. Understanding the effects of gender on negotiation gives us 
important insights into how micro-level interactions contribute to larger social phenomena, such 
as gender gaps in pay and authority. Recent research on gender in negotiation has shown us how 
gender stereotypes constrain women from negotiating access to resources and opportunities 
through lowered performance expectations and gendered behavioral constraints. However, this 
widening research stream is also beginning to provide hints for how individuals and 
organizations can overcome these limitations to women’s negotiation potential.  
 In this chapter, I provide a brief history of psychological research on gender in 
negotiation, starting with the study of gender-stereotypic personality attributions and 
transitioning to a more sophisticated analysis of the effects of gender stereotypes on negotiation 
behaviors and performance. I review contemporary research on gender in negotiation using two 
interrelated frameworks. The first outlines the ways in which gender stereotypes influence 
negotiation, the second outlines situational factors that help predict when gender effects are 
likely to emerge in negotiation. These include ambiguity, which facilitates the emergence of 
gender effects, and gender triggers, which influence the salience and relevance of gender within 
the negotiating context. Finally, I highlight practical implications of research on gender in 
negotiation and point to future research directions that could transform insights about barriers to 
women’s negotiation performance into positive levers for change.      Negotiation     3 
 
A Brief History of the Theoretical Development of Gender in Negotiation 
The story to date of the psychological study of gender in negotiation starts and ends with 
gender stereotypes. Initially, researchers anticipated that gender would function like a personality 
variable, predicting men’s and women’s negotiation behavior and performance in gender-
stereotypic ways. Namely, women would be relationship-oriented cooperators, and men would 
be analytically minded competitors. If men and women fulfilled these expectations, then male 
negotiators would be more effective than female negotiators at “claiming value” (i.e., gaining a 
larger share of the value to be divided) and potentially also at “creating value” (i.e., searching for 
trades that expand the value to be divided; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). However, women might be 
more reliable advocates for peace in a conflict situation (Maoz, 2009). Early scholars of gender 
in negotiation had little success substantiating these stereotypes as consistent predictors of men’s 
and women’s negotiation performance, but contemporary scholars have shown that these gender-
stereotypic expectations continue to thrive, sometimes to virulent effect.  
In the first comprehensive review of research on gender in negotiation, Rubin and Brown 
(1975) reported a confusing array of results in which women were sometimes more cooperative 
than men but at other times defied expectations by acting significantly more competitive. In 
particular, they observed that women’s behavior seemed to be more contingent than men’s on the 
behavior of the other negotiator; for instance, women struck back more forcefully than men 
against perceived defection. Sticking with the premise of gender as trait, Rubin and Brown 
tentatively proposed that women’s personalities might make them less predictable than men, 
such that they are more “interpersonally oriented” and, therefore, less analytic and more reactive 
to their counterparts’ behavior. Rubin and Brown’s chapter stood for more than two decades as 
the primary statement on the topic of gender in the negotiation field.      Negotiation     4 
 
During the 1980s, while social psychologists were developing theories of gender as a 
social role (Eagly, 1987) and contextual phenomenon (Deaux & Major, 1987), mainstream 
negotiation scholars disregarded gender as a failed personality variable. In the mid-1990s, 
psychological researchers started paying that more attention to the social construction of gender 
in negotiation. Informed by advances in psychological research on gender in social behavior, 
they started investigating situational factors that might moderate gender effects in negotiation.  
Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer (1998) published a path-breaking meta-analysis of 
gender and negotiation behavior. Synthesizing 35 years of research, they found a modest overall 
tendency for women to be more cooperative negotiators than men. However, this effect was 
driven by the results of face-to-face negotiations and did not appear to extend to anonymous 
bargaining exercises, such as matrix games, in which parties are typically physically separated 
and make a parsimonious set of behavioral choices with differential expected payoffs (e.g., 
“cooperate” or “defect” in the Prisoner’s Dilemma). They proposed that the potential for 
stereotype conformity increased with the potential for communication between negotiators (e.g., 
greater conformity in face-to-face interactions than in written or scripted ones).  
Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of 21 studies of explicit 
negotiations over issues, such as sales or compensation (i.e., no matrix games). They found that 
men negotiated higher individual payoffs than did women, but also observed preliminary 
evidence that stereotypic gender differences might be greatest in masculine-stereotyped 
negotiations (e.g., compensation or car sales) and when negotiation roles align with gender-
stereotypic status differences (e.g., male employer, female candidate). These meta-analyses 
stoked researchers’ curiosity about when, why, and how gender effects in negotiation emerge.     Negotiation     5 
 
During the first decade of the 21
st century, research on the content and implications of 
gender stereotypes in negotiation became an important research area. Kray and Thompson 
(2004) published an extensive qualitative review of the literature, theorizing that stereotypes 
were the root of gender effects in negotiation. Informed by their own work on stereotype 
fulfillment and reactance in negotiation (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Kray, Reb, 
Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001), they argued for a situational 
approach to the study of gender in negotiation. In their review, they illustrated ebbs and flows of 
gender effects across negotiation contexts. With the benefit of stronger psychological theory and 
empirical evidence than was available to Rubin and Brown (1975), they swept aside the notion of 
gender as a personality type and argued for deeper investigation of how stereotypes influence 
negotiation performance.  
Gender Stereotypes in Negotiation: Use, Fulfillment, Reactance, and Policing 
  The contemporary literature on gender in negotiation can be seen in terms of four ways in 
which gender stereotypes influence negotiation behavior. In this section, I first report on 
evidence that negotiators use gender stereotypes as strategic information. Second, I illustrate how 
negotiators fulfill the prophesies of gender-stereotypic expectations. Third, I explain how 
negotiators sometimes also react to gender stereotypes by defying gendered behavioral 
expectations. Finally, I present evidence of gender-stereotype policing and conformity, which is 
particularly constraining for female negotiators.  
Use of Gender Stereotypes as Strategic Information 
The stereotypes of male and female negotiators align with the broader stereotypes that 
men are agentic and women communal (Eagly, 1987): male negotiators are expected to be 
relatively self-interested and competitive, whereas female counterparts are expected to be more     Negotiation     6 
 
other-concerned and cooperative (for reviews, see Eckel, de Oliveira, & Grossman, 2008; Kray 
& Thompson, 2004). Multiple studies suggest that negotiators use these gender stereotypes to 
infer what type of counterparts they are facing, what type of constituents they are representing, 
and how they themselves are likely to be perceived—“tough” like a man or “soft” like a woman. 
Offer behavior. This strategic use of gender stereotypes is sometimes reflected in 
negotiators’ offer behavior (i.e., initial proposals and the exchange of counterproposals). In both 
laboratory experiments and field studies, researchers have found that negotiators adjust their 
offers depending on whether they are negotiating with a man or a woman. For instance, in two 
studies of the Ultimatum Game,
1 researchers found that negotiators offered more money to men 
than to women and were willing to accept offers for less money from men than from women 
(Solnick, 2001; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). As one researcher observed, “players seem to 
expect that women would be satisfied with a smaller share” (Solnick, 2001, p. 199).  
Ayres and Siegelman (1995) demonstrated a similar pattern of gender discrimination in 
negotiation offers in a field study of 153 new-car dealerships. The researchers matched 
confederate male and female, White and Black buyers for appearance and trained them to use 
standardized bargaining scripts. Pairs of confederates were matched to negotiate separately for 
the same car at the same dealership within a couple of days of one another, such that one 
confederate was always a White male (total 306 negotiations). Results showed that car dealers 
systematically offered lower car prices to male than female and to White than Black buyers. 
In an Israeli-Palestinian peace-negotiation simulation conducted with Jewish-Israeli 
university students, Maoz (2009) hypothesized that negotiators would be more receptive to peace 
proposals that came from female than male opponents because stereotypes suggest women are 
                                                 
1 The Ultimatum Game is an exercise that models the last round of a negotiation. Party 1 makes an offer to Party 2 
for how to divide a resource (e.g., ten dollars). Party 2 then decides whether to accept the offer. If Party 2 accepts the 
offer, the agreement stands. If Party 2 rejects the offer, neither party gets any of the resource.      Negotiation     7 
 
more willing to compromise than men are. As hypothesized, negotiators rated identical proposals 
more favorably when they came from female than male opponents. They also ascribed more 
warmth, less assertiveness, and somewhat more trustworthiness to female than male opponents.  
Adding more nuance, Kray, Locke, and Van Zant (in press) studied how women’s self-
presentation as flirtatious or simply friendly would influence negotiators’ offer behavior. They 
found that participants made less generous offers to women who appeared stereotypically warm 
and friendly than to those who appeared flirtatious. The findings of multiple studies suggested 
that feminine warmth is more of a liability than flirtatious charm because warmth signals a lack 
of competitiveness and concern for self. There were no comparable effects for men.  
Misrepresentation. Another implication of the agreeable feminine stereotype is that 
negotiators perceive the risks associated with lying to female negotiators to be lower than with 
male counterparts (Kray, 2012). Kray conducted an archival analysis of deception in a real-
estate-sale simulation used in a business school negotiation course over three semesters. In this 
particular simulation, it is advantageous for the buyer to mislead the seller about the intended use 
of the property. Kray found that buyers admitted lying to female sellers at a rate three times 
higher than to male sellers. Corroborating evidence of buyer lies revealed the same statistically 
significant pattern of gender discrimination but suggested that the students lied more frequently 
than they admitted in the self-reports. The gender effects were starkest in the case of outright lies 
about the intended use of the property following the sale.  
Persistence. Bowles and Flynn (2010) analyzed the implications of gender stereotypes 
for negotiation persistence in male, female, and mixed-gender pairs. They took a dyadic 
perspective to show that the strategic use of gender stereotypes not only concerns attributions 
made about negotiating counterparts (e.g., female = cooperative and therefore more yielding;     Negotiation     8 
 
male = competitive and therefore more obstinate) but also depends on the gender match or 
mismatch within the negotiating pair. The strategic implications of being paired with a 
cooperatively typed (e.g., feminine-stereotyped) or competitively typed (e.g., masculine-
stereotyped) negotiator differs if the negotiator is competitively or cooperatively typed him- or 
herself. For instance, cooperatively typed negotiators (e.g., women) may anticipate collaborative 
encounters with others they type as cooperative but potentially exploitative interactions with 
those they type as competitive. In contrast, competitively typed negotiators (e.g., men) gain less 
from discriminating between types because their type is likely to invite competitive behavior 
from both competitive and cooperative types (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). 
Bowles and Flynn (2010) ran two experiments in which participants interacted with nay-
saying negotiation counterparts (i.e., parties who refused to budge). As predicted, women 
persisted more strongly in negotiations with male than female naysayers (i.e., more with 
competitively than cooperatively typed counterparts), whereas counterpart gender had no effect 
on men’s persistence behavior. This research suggests that negotiators use gender stereotypes not 
only to judge their counterparts but also to infer what others are likely to expect of them, and that 
these stereotype-based inferences influence fundamental negotiation behaviors.  
Constituent representation. A final illustration of the influence of gender stereotypes 
comes from research on the effects of constituent gender. Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, and Van 
Slyck (1986) tested the effects of negotiating on behalf of a male or female confederate and 
manipulated whether the confederate observed the agent negotiate on his or her behalf (or not). 
They found no significant gender differences in the agents’ negotiating behavior. However, they 
found that agents used more contentious bargaining behavior and negotiated more inequitable 
agreements when being watched (vs. not) by male constituents, and used more cooperative     Negotiation     9 
 
negotiating behavior and achieved more equitable outcomes when being observed (vs. not) by 
female constituents. As the researchers summarized, “Stereotypes are a ready source of 
inferences about constituent expectations” (Pruitt, et al., 1986, p. 271).  
Gender-Stereotype Fulfillment 
Research conducted on the premise that male and female negotiators would consistently 
live up to their gender stereotypes largely met with failure. However, in broad brushstrokes, we 
do observe weak patterns of women negotiating more cooperatively than men and of men 
competitively claiming a greater share of the negotiating pie than women. An important question 
in contemporary negotiation research has been how to explain when and why male and female 
negotiators are likely to fulfill gender stereotypes.  
Stereotype threat. Kray and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that one psychological 
mechanism underlying gender effects in negotiation is “stereotype threat” (Steele, 1997; see Betz 
et al., this volume). Actors experience performance-inhibiting stereotype threat when they are 
aware of negative stereotypes about their group’s abilities in a personally important performance 
domain and feel that their performance in that domain is being evaluated. Negotiation is widely 
recognized as a critical management and business skill in which men have a stereotypic 
advantage over women.  
Kray and colleagues (2001) investigated the potential for gender-stereotype threat in 
negotiation by manipulating whether MBA students had the impression that faculty could 
evaluate their innate negotiating abilities. They assigned mixed-gender pairs of students to play 
buyers and sellers in a biotechnology plant acquisition. Participants were either told that the 
simulation was simply a learning tool (low threat) or that it was diagnostic of their actual 
negotiating abilities (high threat). As predicted, when the negotiators believed that their     Negotiation     10 
 
performance would be diagnostic of their negotiation abilities, women (as compared to men) 
reported lower expectations of their negotiation performance and negotiated less favorable sales 
prices. When negotiators believed the simulation was not diagnostic, the gender effects 
diminished (see also Tellhed & Bjorklund, 2011).  
Stereotype regeneration. In subsequent studies, Kray and colleagues showed that they 
could manipulate associations between gender stereotypes and negotiation performance to 
produce effects that favored either men or women. For instance, Kray and colleagues (2002) 
identified verbal expressiveness, good listening, and emotional empathy as negotiation strengths 
associated more with women than men, and identified being well prepared, open minded, and 
good humored as gender-neutral negotiating strengths. MBA students participated in a 
negotiation that the researchers presented as diagnostic of “important managerial negotiation 
abilities” and that the researchers then linked to either the stereotypically feminine or gender-
neutral negotiating strengths, as described. When high performance was linked to stereotypically 
feminine attributes, the female MBA students entered the negotiation with higher expectations 
and negotiated more favorable outcomes than did their male peers. When performance was 
linked to more gender-neutral traits, the gender effects reverted back to the traditional gender 
stereotype: male (vs. female) students had higher expectations and performance. Kray and 
colleagues (2002) also showed that linking gender-stereotypic traits to poor negotiation 
performance produced gender-correspondent underperformance in both male and female 
negotiators. In sum, one explanation for gender-stereotypic effects in negotiation is that gender-
based performance expectations trigger “self-fulfilling prophesies” (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978).  
Gender-Stereotype Reactance 
Psychological reactance occurs when actors perceive others’ expectations as negatively     Negotiation     11 
 
constraining and they protest by behaving contrary to those expectations (Brehm, 1966). 
Researchers have demonstrated two conditions under which negotiators systematically defy 
gender-stereotypic expectations in this way. One involves the experience of being explicitly 
negatively stereotyped, and other involves heightened impression motivation.  
Explicit stereotyping. As described above, Kray and colleagues (2001) showed that the 
subtle activation of gender stereotypes produces stereotype-consistent gender differences in 
negotiation performance. They also tested the effect of drawing an explicit connection between 
the negotiator’s gender and their likely performance, hypothesizing that it would produce 
psychological reactance and counter-stereotypic negotiation performance. More specifically, 
they hypothesized that explicit stereotyping of female negotiators as inferior to male negotiators 
would motivate reactance in the female negotiators and reverse the gender-stereotypic pattern of 
male dominance in negotiation performance.  
In two studies, Kray and colleagues (2001) linked negotiation performance to gender-
stereotypic traits, specifically high performance to rationality and assertiveness and low 
performance to emotionality and passivity. The researchers then manipulated whether or not the 
negotiators were told that “Because these personality characteristics tend to vary across gender, 
male and female students have been shown to differ in their performance on this task” (Kray, et 
al., 2001, Studies 3 and 4). In both studies, exposure to the explicitly sex-discriminating message 
motivated female negotiators to increase their aspirations and improve their performance, 
ultimately reversing the male advantage in negotiation performance.  
Impression motivation. Another potential mechanism of psychological reactance is 
impression motivation (i.e., concern that one’s behavior will be perceived in a desirable way), 
because negatively stereotyped groups feel motivated to deny negative attributions about their     Negotiation     12 
 
competencies (W. von Hippel et al., 2005). For instance, von Hippel and colleagues (2011) 
showed that women who experience stereotype threat about their leadership abilities adopt a 
more masculine communication style. This masculine style unfortunately backfires because it 
makes the woman less socially attractive and therefore less persuasive. 
Curhan and Overbeck (2008) tested the effects of impression motivation in a candidate-
recruiter job negotiation simulation. In a high impression-motivation condition, they told 
negotiators they would be rewarded or penalized based on their counterpart’s impression of 
them. Students in the control condition received no impression-motivation information. 
Consistent with psychological-reactance theory, Curhan and Overbeck found that female 
negotiators in the recruiter role negotiated significantly more competitively (i.e., counter-
stereotypically) in the impression-motivation condition than in the control condition. 
Interestingly, male negotiators did the inverse, negotiating more cooperatively under impression-
motivation concerns. The results suggest that negotiators sometimes defy gender stereotypes 
when they anticipate that others will evaluate them in an unfavorable, gender-stereotypic way. 
While liberating in some respects, the strategy of playing counter to the stereotype has its 
limitations. Curhan and Overbeck (2008) found that male negotiators who acted more 
cooperatively to create a better impression ended up with lower negotiation payoffs. Female 
negotiators who acted tougher to create a better impression earned higher negotiation payoffs but 
ironically created more negative impressions with their counterparts.  
Gender-Stereotype Policing and Conformity  
Gender stereotypes have both descriptive and prescriptive functions (Eagly, 1987; 
Burgess & Borgida, 1999). The descriptive function informs how we anticipate men and women 
will behave or perform (e.g., “men are more competitive and, therefore, better negotiators than     Negotiation     13 
 
women”). As already discussed, negotiators use descriptive stereotypes to make attributions 
about counterparts and constituents, and descriptive stereotypes sometimes become self-fulfilling 
prophesies or targets of reactance for negotiators themselves. Prescriptive stereotypes relate to 
how we think men and women should act (e.g., “women should be selfless, not demanding”), 
and they inform what we think is appropriate negotiating behavior for men and women. 
The application of prescriptive stereotypes gives rise to gender-stereotype policing, the 
protection and maintenance of gender stereotypes by penalizing those who deviate from their 
prescriptions, and conformity, socially motivated adherence to gender-stereotypic behavioral 
prescriptions. Research shows that policing creates a social motivation for female negotiators, in 
particular, to adhere to gendered behavioral norms to the detriment of their economic interests.  
Women’s compensation-negotiation dilemma. Compensation negotiations are a 
domain in which there has been accumulating evidence of gender differences favoring men 
(Bowles & McGinn, 2008b). Some studies indicate that women are more reticent than men to 
negotiate for higher compensation (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). Others show 
that when negotiating pay, women (as compared to men) set lower aspirations, assert themselves 
less, and depart with poorer outcomes (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Barron, 2003; Bowles, 
Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stevens, et al., 1993). A burning research 
question has been to explain why these gender-stereotypic effects persist in such an 
economically important domain. 
Research by Bowles and colleagues has shown that it is reasonable for women to be more 
reticent than men about negotiating for higher compensation because of the policing of 
prescriptive gender stereotypes (Bowles & Babcock, 2009, in press; Bowles et al., 2007).  
Compensation negotiations are more problematic for female than male negotiators because     Negotiation     14 
 
making claim to greater monetary rewards for oneself violates prescriptions of the feminine 
stereotype. The pursuit of higher compensation aligns with the masculine stereotype of the 
agentic, breadwinning man, but it contradicts normative expectations that the communal woman 
be more concerned for others than for herself (Wade, 2001).   
In multiple studies, Bowles and colleagues recruited participants to evaluate managers 
based on either a transcript or a video of a job placement interview. The participants rated their 
impression of the candidates and their willingness to work with them. The researchers 
manipulated the manager’s gender and whether the manager negotiated for higher compensation. 
They found that evaluators were disinclined to work with female managers who negotiated for 
higher compensation (versus not) because they were perceived to be less nice, more demanding, 
and insufficiently concerned about organizational relationships. In contrast, negotiating had little 
effect on the evaluations of male managers (Bowles & Babcock, in press; Bowles, et al., 2007). 
This pattern of social resistance to female negotiators persisted even when the managers 
bargained for higher compensation on the basis of an outside offer, which is the most commonly 
advised explanation for negotiating for higher pay (Bowles & Babcock, 2009). In sum, women 
(more than men) face a dilemma in compensation negotiation, in which they have to weigh the 
social risks of negotiating against the potential economic benefits. 
Negotiating for self vs. other. Gender-stereotype policing and conformity also help to 
explain why women perform better in negotiations in which they are advocating for others as 
opposed to themselves. Bowles et al. (2005) showed that women negotiate significantly higher 
compensation outcomes when advocating for others than for themselves. In two experimental 
studies, the women’s negotiation outcomes when advocating for others rivaled, if not bested, the 
men’s. Advocating for self versus other had no effects on the performance of male negotiators.      Negotiation     15 
 
Amanatullah and Morris (2010) tested whether greater anticipated social backlash when 
negotiating for self (versus other) would explain this effect. They created a scripted 
compensation negotiation with a computerized confederate and manipulated whether negotiators 
were advocating for themselves or for someone else. Prior to the negotiation, participants 
indicated whether they anticipated backlash for appearing too demanding. The results showed 
that female negotiators advocating for themselves (vs. for others) made more modest 
compensation requests and were less likely to select assertive negotiating scripts among an array 
of bargaining-language options. Anticipated backlash explained the female negotiators’ more 
reticent behavior in the self- versus other-advocacy conditions. Once again, advocating for self 
versus other had no significant effects on the negotiating behavior of male negotiators. In sum, 
when advocating for others, women have more liberty to negotiate forcefully, and gender 
differences in performance decline.   
Summary of Gender Stereotypes in Negotiation 
  Gender stereotypes have four categories of influences in negotiations. Negotiators use 
them as strategic information about the types of offers they should make or how cooperatively or 
competitively they should behave. Negotiators fulfill gender stereotypes, particularly when 
gendered performance expectations are subtly introduced in contexts in which negotiators feel 
they are being evaluated. Negotiators react to gender stereotypes by behaving in counter-
stereotypic ways when they feel constrained by negative gender-stereotypic expectations. 
Finally, negotiators police and conform to gender stereotypes, such that women, in particular, 
become inhibited from asserting their self-interest or even entering the bargaining table.      Negotiation     16 
 
Predicting When Gender Stereotypes Will Influence Negotiation:  
Ambiguity and Gender Triggers 
As illustrated in the previous section, the effects of gender stereotypes are sometimes 
contradictory. They wax, wane, and change direction across negotiation contexts, favoring men 
in many situations but women in others. As such, negotiation researchers face the challenge of 
understanding more deeply the role of situational factors in the manifestation of gender effects.  
Two categories of situational factors help us to predict when gender is likely to influence 
negotiation. One is the degree of ambiguity within the negotiation context, which facilitates the 
emergence of gender effects. The other is the presence of gender triggers, which make gender 
relevant and salient within the negotiation context (Bowles, et al., 2005). Table 1 presents a 
summary of propositions about how particular forms of gender triggers and increased ambiguity 
might combine to increase the likelihood of gender-stereotype use, fulfillment, reactance, and 
policing and conformity.   
Ambiguity 
  Increased ambiguity within the negotiation context facilitates gender effects by 
“weakening” the psychological situation (Mischel, 1977). “Strong” situations operate like traffic 
lights, providing the same clear signal to all participants. Weak situations, in contrast, require 
improvisation and thereby create more potential for individual differences. When a negotiation 
situation is ambiguous, parties must search the environment and their own mental schema for 
cues for how to enact the negotiation. How am I expected to behave? What should my opening 
offer be? What are the appropriate standards for agreement? When searching for answers, 
gendered norms and stereotypes become a source of information about what to expect from 
others and from oneself.      Negotiation     17 
 
Negotiation researchers have identified two types of ambiguity that facilitate gender 
effects: structural ambiguity about the substance of a negotiation (Bowles, et al., 2005) and norm 
ambiguity about standards of behavior (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). I also propose a third category, 
type ambiguity, which relates to how well negotiators and their counterparts or constituents know 
one another.  
 Structural  ambiguity. Structural ambiguity relates to the degree of clarity negotiators 
have about the “zone of possible agreement” (Lax & Sebenius, 1986)—in other words, the issues 
to be resolved and the options available for resolving them—and appropriate standards for 
agreement. Increased structural ambiguity makes it less clear to negotiators what can be 
negotiated and what constitutes a good outcome, opening the door for gendered norms to answer 
these questions. Employing both archival data on MBA students’ job-market outcomes and 
laboratory-based negotiation experiments, Bowles et al. (2005) examined whether increased 
structural ambiguity would produce more gender-stereotypic negotiation outcomes.  
In a study of the salary outcomes of graduating MBA students, Bowles et al. (2005) 
found a $5,000 gender gap favoring men after controlling for more than 30 salary predictors 
(e.g., work experience, pre-MBA salary, dual-career concerns, etc.). We then asked career-
services professionals to rate the ambiguity of salary standards in the industries in which the 
MBA students accepted positions. In industries that were judged to have clearer salary standards 
(low ambiguity)—which was 70 percent of sample—there were no significant gender differences 
in the salary offers accepted by graduating MBA students. In contrast, in industries with 
ambiguous salary standards, female MBA students accepted salaries that were ten percent lower 
than did their male peers. Importantly, there was as much variation in the salary outcomes in     Negotiation     18 
 
low- as in high-ambiguity industries, but gender only explained the variance in the high-
ambiguity industries.   
Bowles and colleagues (2005) complemented these suggestive archival results with 
laboratory studies in which they manipulated structural ambiguity. Under high ambiguity (i.e., no 
clear agreement standards), there were significant gender effects on negotiation performance. 
Under low ambiguity (i.e., clear agreement standards), there were no significant gender effects. 
Again, structural ambiguity had no effect on the variance in outcomes; it only affected whether 
gender predicted negotiation performance.  
 Norm  ambiguity.  Norm ambiguity relates to the degree of clarity about what constitutes 
appropriate negotiating behavior. Kray and Gelfand (2009) examined whether increased norm 
ambiguity would produce more gender-stereotypic reactions to a compensation negotiation. They 
randomly assigned MBA students to respond to a scenario in which their first compensation 
request was either immediately accepted by the employer or in which there were several rounds 
of exchange of concessions before a compensation agreement was reached. Previous research 
suggested that the MBA students would feel less satisfied about the negotiation when their first 
offer was immediately accepted because a quick agreement would suggest they could have asked 
for more (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, 2002). However, Kray and Gelfand hypothesized 
that, if it were unclear whether negotiating was socially appropriate (high norm ambiguity), 
having a first offer accepted would disappoint women less than men because prescriptive gender 
stereotypes make compensation negotiations more socially awkward for women than men 
(Bowles, et al., 2007). In other words, the women would experience “relief versus regret” when 
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Kray and Gelfand (2009) manipulated norm ambiguity by providing or withholding 
information that negotiating for higher compensation was expected and tended to be viewed 
positively by employers as a critical business skill. Under low ambiguity (i.e., negotiating is 
normative), both male and female MBA students expressed more regret when their first offer 
was accepted as compared to when there was an exchange of concessions. Under high norm 
ambiguity, only male MBAs expressed more regret when their first offer was accepted.  
It may have been particularly important to the effectiveness of Kray and Gelfand’s (2009) 
low-ambiguity condition that they described the propensity to negotiate as a behavior that would 
be viewed positively. Small and colleagues (2007) tried to reduce ambiguity and gender 
differences favoring men in the propensity to negotiate by explicitly instructing study 
participants that they could negotiate for higher compensation for their participation. This 
information that “negotiation” was an option only increased gender differences in the propensity 
to negotiate. In contrast, when they told participants they could “ask” for higher compensation, 
gender differences diminished.  Small and colleagues argued that “asking” fits better than 
“negotiating” with normative expectations for low-power behavior and is therefore less 
problematic for women.  
Type ambiguity. I use the term “type ambiguity” to refer to a lack of clarity about the 
negotiating style, competences, or preferences of counterparts or constituents. To the best of my 
knowledge, no research has tested whether gender stereotypes are more influential when 
negotiating counterparts’ or constituents’ types are less well understood. However, it seems 
reasonable to posit that increased type ambiguity would heighten the potential influence of 
gender stereotypes, for at least three reasons. First, negotiators are more likely to try to discern 
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them. This is not to say that gender could not influence existing relationships or reputations, but 
rather that negotiators are less likely to individuate and more likely to use stereotypes when 
assessing less well-known others. Second, when negotiators believe that their own type is 
unknown to the other party, they may be more likely to anticipate that gender will influence 
others’ expectations of their behavior (e.g., “They probably think I’ll be nice because I am a 
woman”). Third, research suggests that men and women are more likely to fall into gender-
stereotypic interactions when their relative competences for or potential contributions to group 
work are unknown (e.g., Wood & Karten, 1986). Gender-stereotypic behavior seems more likely 
the less parties understand about their respective negotiation or substantive expertise.  
Gender Triggers 
  There are four categories of situational factors known to moderate the salience and 
relevance of gender in negotiation. The first of these gender triggers is stereotype activation, the 
manner in which stereotypes are introduced in the negotiation context. The second is role 
congruence, the alignment of negotiating roles with gender-stereotypic behavioral expectations 
(i.e., gender roles, Eagly, 1987). The third is negotiators’ psychological experience of power 
within the role and in the dyad, which can weaken or reinforce the gender status hierarchy. The 
fourth is the salience of social cues about negotiators’ gender identities.  
Stereotype activation. As elaborated above in the discussions of stereotype fulfillment 
and reactance, the influence of descriptive gender stereotypes on negotiation expectations and 
performance depends on whether the stereotype is subtly activated or explicitly named (Kray, et 
al., 2001). Negotiators are more likely to fulfill gender stereotypes when they hang “in the air” 
(Steele, 1997) in such a way that negotiators are aware of the stereotypes and their relevance to 
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stereotyping is more virulent when negotiators feel they are being evaluated. In contrast, when 
gender stereotypes are explicitly linked to negotiation performance, negotiators are likely to react 
against them by negotiating in counter-stereotypical ways.  
To the best of my knowledge, negotiation researchers have not tested directly how the 
activation of gender stereotypes influences either the use of gender stereotypes as strategic 
information or the policing and conformity to gender stereotypes. However, as proposed in Table 
1, I hypothesize that subtle activation of gender stereotypes would heighten the potential for 
these two phenomena. The use of stereotypes as strategic information seems more likely if 
negotiators are primed to make gender-stereotypic associations; indeed, that is probably part of 
the dynamic of stereotype-threat effects on negotiation performance in mixed-gender pairs 
(Kray, et al., 2001). Likewise, the policing of gender stereotypes may be more pronounced if 
negotiators are more attuned to normative expectations for male and female negotiators.   
Role congruence. Another potential trigger of gender effects in negotiation is the degree 
to which the negotiator’s role corresponds with or contradicts the expectations of their gender 
role (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, in press). This correspondence or contradiction contributes to 
gender differences in at least two ways. First, role incongruence could inhibit negotiators 
because a counter-stereotypic negotiating role is socially risky. For instance, self-advocating in a 
compensation negotiation is gender-role congruent for men but gender-role incongruent for 
women. Therefore, women tend to be penalized more than men for self-advocating for higher 
pay (Bowles et al., 2007). In contrast, advocating for someone else in a compensation negotiation 
is role congruent for both genders—for women as caregivers and men as chivalrous protectors 
(Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al, 2005).      Negotiation     22 
 
Second, negotiators may feel less confident about negotiating roles that have a perceived 
“lack of fit” with their gender (Heilman, 1983). Bear (2011) showed that negotiators tend to 
avoid negotiations that contradict their gender role. Bear and Babcock (2012) demonstrated that 
they could eliminate the male performance advantage in a competitive bargaining simulation by 
changing the topic of the negotiation from the sale of motorcycle parts (masculine stereotyped) 
to beads (feminine stereotyped). Male negotiators bested their female counterparts when 
negotiating the sale of motorcycle parts, but there were no gender differences in performance 
when beads were at stake. Miles and Lasalle (2008) similarly found that men’s and women’s 
perceived self-efficacy in negotiation was more positively predictive of their outcomes when 
they were negotiating over gender-congruent topics (i.e., hiring a babysitter for women vs. hiring 
an alligator wrestler for men).  
Power dynamics. Gender stereotypes are intimately related to men’s and women’s 
power and status in society (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Ridgeway, 2011). The 
feminine stereotype corresponds with the expectations of low-power behavior (e.g., other-
oriented, agreeable, deferential), whereas the masculine stereotype corresponds with expectations 
for high-power behavior (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996). Lower-status actors are 
expected to be concerned about others because doing so makes them seem more useful and less 
threatening to the social order (Jackman, 1994; Ridgeway, 1982).  
Situational dynamics that increase women’s power relative to men in negotiation are 
likely to decrease gender-stereotypic effects favoring men (for theoretical discussions, see 
Karakowsky & Miller, 2006; Miles & Clenney, 2010). For example, research on gender and the 
propensity to initiate negotiations found that the psychological experience of high (vs. low) 
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negotiate (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). Men’s propensity to negotiate was not 
responsive to power manipulations, perhaps because they experience chronically higher power 
than women in negotiation situations (Magee, et al., 2007; Small, et al., 2007).  
Social cues. People commonly discern others’ gender by their physical appearance, the 
timbre of their voice, and other social cues, such as a gender-stereotypical name. The more social 
cues a situation provides (e.g., face-to-face meetings have more than the telephone, which has 
more than written communication), the more potential there is for a speaker’s gender to become 
an interpretative or evaluative frame in communication (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983). As discussed 
already, meta-analytic research on gender in negotiation indicates that stereotypic effects on 
behavior and performance are more likely to arise when there is more communication potential 
between parties (Stuhlmacher, Citera, & Willis, 2007; Walters, et al., 1998).  
Stuhlmacher and colleagues (2007) found that female negotiators were significantly less 
aggressive in face-to-face than in virtual (e.g., email) negotiations. This could be because face-
to-face interactions heighten gender-stereotypic expectations that women even more than men 
will be concerned about departing the negotiation with a good relationship (Gelfand, Majoy, 
Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006). It could also be because women experience a heightened self-
consciousness about the policing of prescriptive stereotypes, as described earlier, in face-to-face 
than in more socially distant contexts. 
Ambiguity and Gender Triggers in Interaction 
  Ambiguity and gender triggers work in interaction, such that gender triggers are more 
influential with more ambiguity. Bowles et al. (2005) demonstrated the interactive effects of 
ambiguity and gender triggers by manipulating structural ambiguity and role congruence (i.e., 
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role had a significantly greater effect on women than men. Women negotiated significantly better 
outcomes when advocating for others than for themselves; there was no advocacy effect for men. 
Under low ambiguity, advocacy role had no effect for men or women, apparently because 
women were less concerned about role incongruence when they had clear negotiating 
instructions. The flow of the propositions in Table 1 illustrates further the potentially interactive 
effects of gender triggers and ambiguity on negotiation behavior. 
Practical Implications and Future Research Directions 
  Taking inspiration from developments in social-psychological research on gender in 
social behavior, the negotiation field has made enormous strides in understanding the role of 
gender in negotiation behavior and outcomes. An important practical implication of this progress 
has been the insights gained into how negotiation processes function as micro-mechanisms of 
gender inequality in organizations (for a review, see Bowles & McGinn, 2008b). Recognizing 
that negotiation is an instrumental social process in the construction and reinforcement of gender 
inequality, negotiation scholars have become increasingly concerned with generating strategies 
to close gender gaps in negotiated outcomes. This prescriptive vein of research remains in its 
infancy, but a number of clear propositions have emerged.  
Strategies for Women  
  Reduce ambiguity. One clear implication of the research on ambiguity is that women are 
likely to benefit from the establishment of clear standards for agreement and norms of acceptable 
behavior. However, Bowles and McGinn (2008a) caution about gender bias in the information 
search itself, particularly in contexts with a pattern of differential outcomes for men and women 
(e.g., compensation). There is a general tendency for women to compare themselves to other 
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Shah, 1998). This tendency is reinforced by the gendered structure of social networks, in which 
women tend to be more closely connected with women than men, and vice versa (Ibarra, 1993). 
Therefore, in negotiation contexts with a pattern of outcomes favoring men over women, 
reducing ambiguity in itself (e.g., establishing standards for agreement) will not be beneficial to 
women relative to men unless women collect information representative of men’s as well as 
women’s experiences. Performance differences are likely to be reduced when men and women 
negotiate from comparable standards, but not if they draw from gendered points of reference.  
  Raise awareness about stereotypes. Research suggests that simply educating women 
about stereotypes can help them combat some of stereotypes’ pernicious effects. Johns, 
Schmader, and Martens (2005) tested the effectiveness of educating women about stereotype 
threat in a math-performance study. The stereotype that men are better at math than women is 
widely held and easily activated. Researchers presented men and women with difficult math 
problems and manipulated whether they perceived they were being evaluated. As described 
earlier, stereotype-threat effects tend to emerge when stereotypes are implicitly activated and 
participants feel they are being evaluated. In a third condition, the researchers added an 
explanation of the detrimental effects of stereotype threat on women’s math performance. The 
first two conditions produced the traditional pattern of stereotype threat, in which women 
perform less well than men when they believe they are being evaluated. Yet, in the third 
condition, the evaluation manipulation had no effect on women’s math performance relative to 
men’s because the women were warned about stereotype threat.  
  Taking inspiration from John and colleagues (2005), Kray (2007) proposed that one 
strategy for female negotiators to resist fulfilling negative gender stereotypes is to raise their 
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regeneration (Kray, et al., 2002), Kray (2007) also suggested that women might combat negative 
gender stereotypes in negotiation by contemplating stereotypic advantages of their gender (e.g., 
good listening and verbal skills) or by tapping other positively stereotyped identities (e.g., MBA 
or other professional identities; see also Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999).   
Use knowledge about stereotypes. Female negotiators could also use their knowledge of 
prescriptive gender stereotypes to craft strategies that enhance their persuasiveness and avoid the 
risks of social backlash (see Kulik & Olekalns, in press; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, & 
Amanatullah, 2009). Women benefit even more than men from adjusting their negotiating style 
to the social situation. For instance, Flynn and Ames (2006) found that increased propensity for 
self-monitoring (i.e., attending and adapting to one’s social environment, Snyder, 1974) 
produced significant performance advantages for female but not for male negotiators. In the 
Bowles and Flynn (2010) persistence studies described earlier, it was primarily the higher-
performing female negotiators who adjusted their style of persistence to the gender of their 
negotiating counterpart. 
Searching for answers to women’s compensation negotiation dilemma, Bowles and 
Babcock (in press) tested the differential effects of varied negotiation scripts on men’s and 
women’s social outcomes (i.e., evaluators’ willingness to work with them after negotiating) and 
negotiation outcomes (i.e., evaluators’ willingness to grant their requests). Varying the 
negotiation scripts had no effects on men’s social or negotiation outcomes, but it did affect 
women’s. They found that conforming to gender stereotypes—for instance, by emphasizing the 
importance of their organizational relationships—improved women’s social outcomes, but it did 
not enhance evaluators’ willingness to grant their requests. Drawing on the literature and advice 
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strategy for improving women’s social and negotiation outcomes, called “relational accounts.”  
Relational accounts are explanations for why negotiation requests are legitimate that also 
demonstrate concern for organizational relationships (Bowles & Babcock, in press). One 
example is for a woman to present her propensity to negotiate as an asset she brings to her work. 
This makes her propensity to negotiate seem more legitimate and enables her to present herself 
as a team player. Bowles and Babcock emphasize that the principles underlying relational 
accounts—demonstrating the legitimacy of the request and concern for organizational 
relationships—are more important than the specific language they tested. In other words, women 
should devise relational accounts that are authentic and fit their negotiation situation. 
Open research questions. One important unanswered question is the extent to which 
research and prescriptive advice on gender in negotiation apply to all groups of women. The 
overwhelming majority of participants and targets of evaluation in research on gender in 
negotiation have been White college-educated Americans. It remains an open question how 
women’s multiple identities play out in negotiation and whether other status-linked social 
identities might moderate established effects (Kolb, in press). For instance, there is emerging 
evidence that gender-based social backlash effects documented with White targets of evaluation 
are reversed when the targets are Black, suggesting that Black women have more freedom than 
White women or Black men to assert their dominance in work situations (Livingston, Rosette, & 
Washington, 2012). There is also strong evidence that maternal status alters women’s 
compensation and career potential (Budig & England, 2001; Correll, Benard, & Paik, 2007), yet 
there is little empirical research on how maternal status affects women’s career-related 
negotiations (Bowles & McGinn, 2008b; Kolb, in press). Researchers on gender in negotiation 
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influence established gender effects.   
Strategies for Organizations 
Negotiation scholars recognize that the onus for correcting the distortionary effects of 
gender stereotypes in negotiation should not be placed solely on women, yet little scholarly 
attention has been paid to strategies for organizations (Kolb, 2009, in press). Indeed, because 
psychological research methods (e.g., laboratory studies, survey experiments) predominate in 
negotiation, most research on gender in negotiation is virtually freestanding of organizational 
context. There are, however, some important implications of existing research for organizations, 
as well as wide-open opportunities for researchers to investigate organizational characteristics as 
facilitator or mitigators of gender effects in negotiation (Bowles & McGinn, 2008b).  
Reduce ambiguity. One strategy for organizations that flows from existing research on 
gender in negotiation is to reduce ambiguity by making more transparent what career 
opportunities, resources, or rewards are negotiable and what the standards are for attaining them 
(see also Fuegen & Biernat, this volume). Borrowing from Rousseau’s (2005) work on “i-deals” 
(i.e., idiosyncratic employment arrangements), Kulik and Olekalns (in press) have suggested that 
organizations create “zones of negotiability” that specify what terms of employment are open to 
discussion and reformulation (e.g., schedule, training, etc.). Providing greater transparency about 
what is negotiable and about organizational standards for agreement is likely to reduce the 
influence of gender stereotypes on negotiation outcomes. Helping women identify as well as men 
can what opportunities are available could reduce the gender biases in prenegotiation information 
flows that stem from gendered social networks (Belliveau, 2005; Ibarra, 1993). A diagnostic 
question for organizational leaders is how do employees learn what is negotiable—through 
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Raise awareness of and address gender stereotypes. Organizations have a role to play 
in educating employees about implicit gender stereotypes, to help arm them against phenomena, 
such as stereotype threat, and to raise evaluators’ self-awareness of their influences (Kray & 
Shirako, 2011). In the United States, gender stereotypes are more likely to be embedded in taken-
for-granted work practices and behavioral patterns than manifest in explicit forms of gender 
discrimination (Kolb, 2009; Sturm, 2001). Diagnostic questions for organizational leaders 
include: To what extent might employees’ career-related negotiations be influenced by the 
historically gendered distribution of resources, opportunities, and rewards within the 
organization? Do men and women feel equally at liberty to self-advocate without backlash in 
career-related negotiations? Can employees negotiate to find creative solutions to work-family 
conflicts without fear of undermining their perceived value within the organization?  
Open research questions. There is a real need to better understand how organizational 
culture and context moderate gender effects in negotiation. For instance, while a number of 
careful studies indicate that women are less inclined than men to negotiate for career rewards, 
such as compensation (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Greig, 2008; Small, et al., 
2007), the results of other survey studies suggest that such effects are more pronounced in some 
organizational contexts than others (e.g., Crothers et al., 2010; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; O'Shea & 
Bush, 2002; Schneider, Tinsley, Cheldelin, & Amanatullah, 2010). Yet, we have little insight 
into what systematic contextual factors, other than ambiguity, might account for this variation.  
Psychological research suggests a number of factors that might help to explain variation 
in male and female negotiators’ experiences across organizational contexts. For instance, more 
gender-stereotyped occupations or organizational contexts could heighten the potential for role 
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women in more feminized occupations. Heilman (1980) found that decreasing the proportion of 
women in an applicant pool produced more negative evaluations of female candidates. Similarly, 
Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky (1992) found that female leaders were evaluated more negatively 
when they stepped into historically male-dominated leadership roles. Psychological research 
enlightening gender triggers embedded in organizational structures, cultures, and practices would 
make important practical and theoretical contributions to the negotiation field.  
Conclusions 
Psychological research on gender in negotiation has progressed dramatically in the past 
25 years, from the application of ill-fitting personality theories to a deeper understanding of the 
effects of gender stereotypes in context. Perhaps the greatest contribution thus far has been the 
illumination of negotiation as a micro-mechanism of gender inequality in organizations, 
widening the gender gaps in pay and authority. Yet, following in the best traditions of 
negotiation research, we should not stop at the point of explaining how gender stereotypes hinder 
negotiation performance. Rather, we should continue on the next step of devising research-based 
prescriptive suggestions for untying the knotty problems we have uncovered.        Negotiation     31 
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Table 1. Summary of Propositions: When Are Gender Stereotypes Likely to Influence Negotiations?  
 
  When are gender stereotypes more influential?  
Influences of gender stereotypes:   Gender Triggers  Ambiguity 
Use as Strategic Information 
Proposition 1: Negotiators are more 
likely to use gender stereotypes to 
make inferences about their 
counterparts’ (or constituents’) 
“types” (e.g., competitive vs. 
cooperative)… 
(a) …when gender stereotypes are 
implicitly activated.  
(b) …when negotiating roles align with or 
contradict gender roles.  
(c) …when power dynamics reinforce 
gender stereotypes.  
(d) …when there are more social cues of 
counterparts’ (or constituents’) gender.  
(e) …the less familiar they are with 
counterparts’ (or constituents’) negotiating 
style, competences, or preferences (i.e., 
increased type ambiguity). 
(f) …the less clarity they have about the zone 
of possible agreement and standards for 
agreement (i.e., increased structural 
ambiguity). 
(g) …the less clarity they have about how they 
should behave (i.e., increased norm 
ambiguity). 
Stereotype Fulfillment 
Proposition 2: Negotiators are more 
likely to fulfill gender stereotypes, … 
(a) …when gender stereotypes are 
implicitly activated and negotiators feel 
they are being evaluated.  
(b) …when negotiating roles align with 
gender roles.  
(c) …when power dynamics reinforce 
gender stereotypes.  
(d) …when there are more social cues of the 
parties’ gender. 
(e) …the less familiar parties are with one 
another’s negotiating style, competences, or 
preferences (i.e., increased type ambiguity). 
(f) …the less clarity they have about the zone 
of possible agreement and standards for 
agreement (i.e., increased structural 
ambiguity). 
(g) …the less clarity they have about how they 
should behave in the negotiation (i.e., 
increased norm ambiguity). 
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Stereotype Reactance 
Proposition 1: Negotiators are more 
likely to resist gender stereotypes by 
self-presenting in counter-stereotypic 
ways… 
(a) …when negotiators are confronted with 
explicit gender stereotypes.  
(b) …when negotiators have a strong 
impression motivation to contradict the 
stereotype.  
(c) …when there are more social cues of the 
parties’ gender. 
(d) …the less clarity they have about how they 
should behave in the negotiation (i.e., 
increased norm ambiguity). 
 
Stereotype Policing and Conformity 
Proposition 2: Negotiators are more 
likely to police and conform to 
gender stereotypes… 
(a) …when gender stereotypes are 
implicitly activated in the negotiation 
context.  
(b) …when negotiating roles conflict with 
gender roles.  
(c) …when power dynamics reinforce 
gender stereotypes.   
(d) …when there are more social cues of the 
parties’ gender. 
(e) …the less clarity they have about how 
targets of evaluation should behave in the 
negotiation (i.e., increased norm ambiguity). 
 
 
 
 